Distributed DBMS reliability

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These slides are a modified version of the slides provided with the book Özsu and Valduriez, *Principles of Distributed Database Systems* (3rd Ed.), 2011 The original version of the slides is available at: extras.springer.com

Outline (distributed DB)

- Introduction (Ch. 1) *
- Distributed Database Design (Ch. 3) *
- Distributed Query Processing (Ch. 6-8) *
- Distributed Transaction Management (Ch. 10-12) *
 - → Introduction to transaction management (Ch. 10) *
 - → Distributed Concurrency Control (Ch. 11) *
 - → Distributed DBMS Reliability (Ch. 12) *

^{*} Özsu and Valduriez, Principles of Distributed Database Systems (3rd Ed.), 2011

Outline (today)

- Distributed DBMS Reliability (Ch. 12) *
 - → Introduction and local reliability protocols
 - → Distributed reliability protocols
 - → Two-phase commit (2PC) protocol

^{*} Özsu and Valduriez, Principles of Distributed Database Systems (3rd Ed.), 2011

Reliability

Problem:

How to maintain

atomicity

durability

properties of transactions

Fundamental Definitions

Reliability

- → A measure of success with which a system conforms to some authoritative specification of its behavior
- Availability
 - → The fraction of the time that a system meets its specification
- Failure
 - → The deviation of a system from the behavior that is described in its specification

Types of Failures

- Transaction failures
 - → Transaction aborts (unilaterally or due to deadlock)
- System (site) failures
 - → Failure of processor, main memory, power supply, ...
 - → Main memory contents are lost, but secondary storage contents are safe
 - → Partial (some sites) vs. total (all sites) failure
- Media failures
 - → Failure of secondary storage devices such that the stored data is lost
 - → Head crash/controller failure (?)
 - → Permanent data loss (secondary, resilient, stable memory hard disk)
- Communication failures
 - → Lost/undeliverable messages
 - → Network partitioning


Update Strategies

- In-place update
 - → Each update causes a change in one or more data values in the database
 - → More efficient, more difficult to undo
- Out-of-place update
 - → Each update causes the new value(s) of data item(s) to be stored separately from the old value(s)
 - → Less efficient, easy to undo

In-Place Update Recovery Information

Database Log

Every action of a transaction must not only perform the action, but must also write a *log* record to an append-only file.



Logging

The log contains information used by the recovery process to restore the consistency of a system. This information may include


- → transaction identifier
- → type of operation (action)
- → items accessed by the transaction to perform the action
- → old value (state) of item (before image)
- → new value (state) of item (after image)

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
Why Logging?

Upon recovery:

- \rightarrow all of T_1 's effects should be reflected in the database (REDO if necessary due to a failure)
- \rightarrow none of T_2 's effects should be reflected in the database (UNDO if necessary)




REDO Protocol



- REDO'ing an action means performing it again
- The REDO operation uses the log information
- REDO is needed when effects of a committed transaction were not stored yet in secondary (stable, resilient) memory
 - → sometimes for efficiency reasons storying information to disk (secondary memory) is done at a later time

UNDO Protocol



- UNDO'ing an action means to restore the object to its before image
- The UNDO operation uses the log information
- UNDO is needed when effects of a transaction are stored in secondary (stable, resilient) memory and then an abort occurs
 - → sometimes to free main memory, information is stored to disk (secondary memory) before commit

When to Write Log Records Into Stable Store

Assume a transaction *T* updates a page *P*

- Fortunate case
 - \rightarrow System writes *P* in stable database
 - → System updates stable log for this update
 - → SYSTEM FAILURE OCCURS!... (before *T* commits)

We can recover (undo) by restoring *P* to its old state by using the log

- Unfortunate case
 - \rightarrow System writes *P* in stable database
 - → SYSTEM FAILURE OCCURS!... (before stable log is updated)

We cannot recover from this failure because there is no log record to restore the old value.

Solution: Write-Ahead Log (WAL) protocol

Write-Ahead Log Protocol

• Notice:

- → If a system crashes before a transaction is committed, then all the operations must be undone. Only need the before images (*undo portion* of the log)
- → Once a transaction is committed, some of its actions might have to be redone. Need the after images (*redo portion* of the log)

• WAL protocol :

- Before a stable database is updated, the undo portion of the log should be written to the stable log
- When a transaction commits, the redo portion of the log must be written to stable log prior to the updating of the stable database.

Execution of Commands

Commands to consider:

begin_transaction

read

write

abort

commit

recover

Independent of execution strategy for LRM

Execution Strategies

- Dependent upon
 - → Can the buffer manager (BM) decide to write some of the buffer pages being accessed by a transaction into stable storage or does it wait for LRM to instruct it?
 - ◆ fix/no-fix decision (fix means BM cannot store the data into disk before commit)
 (no-fix means BM can store data to disk before commit)
 - → Does the LRM force the buffer manager to write certain buffer pages into stable database at the end of a transaction's execution?
 - ◆ flush/no-flush decision (flush means BM cannot wait; it must store data into disk at commit)
 (no-flush means BM can wait; it can store data into disk at a later time)
- Possible execution strategies:
 - → no-fix/no-flush
 - → no-fix/flush
 - → fix/no-flush
 - → fix/flush

No-Fix/No-Flush

Abort

- → Buffer manager may have written some of the updated pages into stable database (second memory, disk)
- → LRM performs transaction undo

Commit

- → LRM writes an "end_of_transaction" record into the log
- → Data not necessarily written into disk

Recover

- → For those transactions that have both a "begin_transaction" and an "end_of_transaction" record in the log, a redo is initiated by LRM
- → For those transactions that only have a "begin_transaction" in the log, an undo is executed by LRM

No-Fix/Flush

Abort

- → Buffer manager may have written some of the updated pages into stable database (second memory, disk)
- → LRM performs transaction undo

Commit

- → LRM issues a flush command to the buffer manager for all updated pages
 - ⋆ i.e., data is stored into disk at time of commit
- → LRM writes an "end_of_transaction" record into the log

Recover

- → No need to perform redo
- → Perform undo

Fix/No-Flush

- Abort
 - → None of the updated pages have been written into stable database
 - → Release the fixed pages
- Commit
 - → LRM writes an "end_of_transaction" record into the log
 - → Data not necessarily written into disk
 - → LRM sends an unfix command to the buffer manager for all pages that were previously fixed
- Recover
 - → Perform redo
 - → No need to perform undo

Fix/Flush

- Abort
 - → None of the updated pages have been written into stable database
 - → Release the fixed pages
- Commit (the following have to be done atomically)
 - → LRM issues a flush command to the buffer manager for all updated pages
 - ⋆ i.e., data is stored into disk at time of commit
 - LRM sends an unfix command to the buffer manager for all pages that were previously fixed
 - → LRM writes an "end_of_transaction" record into the log
- Recover
 - → No need to do anything

Checkpoints

- Simplifies the task of determining actions (of transactions) that need to be undone or redone when a failure occurs
 - → Avoid scanning the whole log
- A checkpoint identify a consistent state of the DB
- Steps to create a checkpoint:
 - Write a begin_checkpoint record into the log
 - 2 Collect the checkpoint data into the stable storage (log and actual DB data)
 - During this phase stop accepting new transactions, complete all currently active ones
 - Write an end_checkpoint record into the log

Distributed Reliability Protocols

- Commit protocols
 - → How to execute commit command for distributed transactions
 - Issue: how to ensure atomicity and durability?
- Termination protocols
 - → If a failure occurs, how the remaining operational sites behave
 - → *Non-blocking* : the occurrence of failures should not force the sites to wait until the failure is repaired to terminate the transaction
- Recovery protocols
 - → When a failure occurs, how the sites where the failure occurred behave after they are back on
 - → *Independent*: a failed site can determine the outcome of a transaction without having to obtain remote information.
- Independent recovery ⇒ non-blocking termination


Two-Phase Commit (2PC)

- → **Coordinator** :The process at the site where the transaction originates and which controls the execution
- → **Participant**: The process at the other sites that participate in executing the transaction
- *Phase 1*: The coordinator gets the participants ready to commit and collects their reply
- *Phase* 2: The coordinator decides global-abort/global-commit depending on participants' replies, communicate the decision to them, and waits for ack's


Global Commit Rule:

- The coordinator aborts a transaction if and only if at least one participant votes to abort it
 - Equivalently: The coordinator commits a transaction if and only if all of the participants vote to commit it

Centralized 2PC




Linear 2PC



VC: Vote-Commit, VA: Vote-Abort, GC: Global-commit, GA: Global-abort


Distributed 2PC




Variations of 2PC

- Presumed abort 2PC and presumed commit 2PC
- Coordinator and participant may assume global-abort or global-commit if they do not get communication
 - → Reduced communication

2PC Protocol Actions




State Transitions in 2PC



Site Failures - 2PC Termination

- Timeout in WAIT
 - → Cannot unilaterally commit
 - → Can unilaterally abort
- Timeout in ABORT or COMMIT
 - Stay blocked and wait for the acks
 - Repeatedly send "global-commit" or "global-abort" to unresponsive participants

COORDINATOR




Site Failures - 2PC Termination

Timeout in INITIAL

- Coordinator must have failed in INITIAL state
- → Unilaterally abort
- Timeout in READY
 - → Stay blocked
 - → Repeatedly send "vote-commit" to coordinator
- If participants can communicate, they can resolve blocked situations. Assume P_i timed out in READY and it asks to P_i
 - $\rightarrow P_j$ in INITIAL: P_j abort
 - \rightarrow P_j in READY: nothing can be done
 - → P_j in ABORT/COMMIT: P_j send "vote-commit"/"vote-abort to P_i

PARTICIPANTS




Re-election of the coordinator

- If participants can communicate ...
- ... and all of them know that the coordinator site is the only failing one
- then another coordinator is elected and the protocol is re-started
 - Election by ordering participants or by any voting procedure
- Does not work if a participant site fails besides the coordinator. Indeed:
 - → Participant receive communication from coordinator
 - → Participant terminate transaction accordingly
 - → Participant and coordinator sites both fail
 - → A new execution of the protocol among the remaining participants through reelection of coordinator might lead to a different decision
- 2PC is a blocking protocol

Site Failures - 2PC Recovery

- Failure in INITIAL
 - → Start the commit process upon recovery
- Failure in WAIT
 - → Restart the commit process upon recovery
- Failure in ABORT/COMMIT
 - → Nothing special if all the acks have been received
 - → Otherwise invoke the termination protocol for timeout in ABORT/COMMIT




COORDINATOR

Site Failures - 2PC Recovery

- Failure in INITIAL
 - → Unilaterally abort upon recovery
- Failure in READY
 - → The coordinator has been informed about the local decision
 - Treat as timeout in READY state and invoke the termination protocol
- Failure in ABORT or COMMIT
 - → Nothing special needs to be done

PARTICIPANTS



2PC Recovery Protocols – Additional Cases

Arise due to non-atomicity of log and message send actions

- Coordinator site fails after writing "begin_commit" log and before sending "prepare" command
 - → treat it as a failure in WAIT state; invoke recovery protocol from WAIT (send "prepare" command)
- Participant site fails after writing "ready" record in log but before "votecommit" is sent
 - → treat it as failure in READY state
 - → invoke recovery protocol from READY
- Participant site fails after writing "abort" record in log but before "voteabort" is sent
 - → no need to do anything upon recovery


2PC Recovery Protocols – Additional Cases (cont'd)

- Coordinator site fails after logging its final decision record but before sending its decision to the participants
 - → coordinator treats it as a failure in COMMIT or ABORT state
 - → participants treat it as timeout in the READY state
- Participant site fails after writing "abort" or "commit" record in log but before acknowledgement is sent
 - → participants treat it as failure in COMMIT or ABORT state
 - send ACK message upon request
 - → coordinator will handle it by timeout in COMMIT or ABORT state

Problem With 2PC

- Blocking
 - → "Ready" state implies that the participant waits for the coordinator
 - → If coordinator fails, site is blocked until recovery
 - → Blocking reduces availability
- Independent recovery is not possible
- However, it is known that:
 - → Independent recovery protocols exist only for single site failures; no independent recovery protocol exists which is resilient to multiple-site failures.
- 3PC is non-blocking (for (single) site failures)
- Communication line failures (network partitioning) are more problematic
 - → No non-blocking protocol exists

Media Failures – Full Architecture



More Problematic Failure Types

- We only considered failures of omission
 - → A message is not received, a site is unresponsive
- Failures of commissions
 - → Implementation errors (system does not work as expected): incorrect messages
 - → Malicious behaviors: a participant pretends to be the coordinator
 - → Addressed using byzantine agreement