

Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Physics, University of Udine

The Safety Fragment of Temporal Logics on Infinite Sequences

Lesson 3

Luca Geatti

luca.geatti@uniud.it

Angelo Montanari

angelo.montanari@uniud.it

April 11th, 2024



Counter-free Automata over finite words

- Let $\mathcal{A} = \langle Q, \Sigma, I, \delta, F \rangle$ be a *deterministic* finite automaton (DFA).
- For each $\langle \sigma_0, \sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n \rangle \in \Sigma^*$ and for each $q \in Q$, we define

$$\delta^*(q, \langle \sigma_0, \sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n \rangle) = \begin{cases} \delta(q, \sigma_0) & \text{if } n = 0 \\ \delta(\delta^*(q, \langle \sigma_0, \dots, \sigma_{n-1} \rangle), \sigma_n) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- For any word $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ and any $i \in \mathbb{N}$, we define $(\sigma)^i$ as the word obtained from i concatenations of σ .

Definition (Nontrivial cycle)

A word $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ (with $\sigma \neq \varepsilon$) defines a *nontrivial cycle* in \mathcal{A} if there exists a state $q \in Q$ such that:


- $\delta^*(q, \sigma) \neq q$
- $\delta^*(q, (\sigma)^i) = q$.

for some $i > 1$.

Definition (Counter-free DFA)

A DFA \mathcal{A} is called *counter-free* if there are no words that define a nontrivial cycle.

We denote this class by **cf-DFA**.



This automaton is *not* counter-free. The word ab defines the nontrivial cycle:

$$q_0 \xrightarrow{ab} q_4 \xrightarrow{ab} q_2 \xrightarrow{ab} q_0.$$



- The definition of counter-free automaton requires a *deterministic* automaton.
- NBA are not closed under *determinization*.
- We change the type of automata over ω -words which we work with.

⇒ **Rabin Automata**

Definition (DRA)

A *Deterministic Rabin Automaton* (DRA, for short) is a tuple $\langle Q, \Sigma, q_0, \delta, F \rangle$ where

$$F = \langle (A_1, B_1), \dots, (A_n, B_n) \rangle$$

with $A_i, B_i \subseteq Q$.

A run $\pi := \langle q_0, q_1, \dots \rangle \in Q^\omega$ is said to be *accepting* iff there exists some $i \in [1, n]$ such that

- $\text{Inf}(\pi) \cap B_i \neq \emptyset$ and
- $\text{Inf}(\pi) \cap A_i = \emptyset$.



Theorem

Deterministic Rabin Automata are equivalent to Nondeterministic Büchi Automata.

Definition (Counter-free DRA)

A DRA \mathcal{A} is called *counter-free* if there are no words that define a nontrivial cycle. We call **cf-DRA** this class.

Definition (DRA)

A *Deterministic Rabin Automaton* (DRA, for short) is a tuple $\langle Q, \Sigma, q_0, \delta, F \rangle$ where

$$F = \langle (A_1, B_1), \dots, (A_n, B_n) \rangle$$

with $A_i, B_i \subseteq Q$.

A run $\pi := \langle q_0, q_1, \dots \rangle \in Q^\omega$ is said to be *accepting* iff there exists some $i \in [1, n]$ such that

- $\text{Inf}(\pi) \cap B_i \neq \emptyset$ and
- $\text{Inf}(\pi) \cap A_i = \emptyset$.



Theorem (Expressive Equivalence for cf-DRA)

For each ω -language $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \Sigma^\omega$, it holds that:

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathcal{L} \text{ is star-free} \\ &\text{iff} \\ &\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}) \text{ for some cf-DRA } \mathcal{A} \end{aligned}$$

Theorem (Expressive Equivalence for cf-DFA)

For each language $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \Sigma^*$, it holds that:

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathcal{L} \text{ is star-free} \\ &\text{iff} \\ &\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}^{<\omega}(\mathcal{A}) \text{ for some cf-DFA } \mathcal{A} \end{aligned}$$



Reference:

Robert McNaughton and Seymour A Papert (1971). *Counter-Free Automata (MIT research monograph no. 65).* The MIT Press

Reference:


Wolfgang Thomas (1979). “Star-free regular sets of ω -sequences”. In: *Information and Control* 42.2, pp. 148–156. DOI: 10.1016/S0019-9958(79)90629-6

Reference:

Ina Schiering and Wolfgang Thomas (1996). “Counter-free automata, first-order logic, and star-free expressions extended by prefix oracles”. In: *Developments in Language Theory, II (Magdeburg, 1995)*, World Sci. Publishing, River Edge, NJ, pp. 166–175




Characterizations of ω -Star-free Languages





Characterizations of Star-free Languages





Temporal logic is the de-facto standard language for specifying properties of systems in *formal verification* and *artificial intelligence*.

- born in the '50s as a tool for philosophical argumentation about time

Reference:

Arthur N Prior (2003). *Time and modality*. John Locke Lecture

- the idea of its use in formal verification can be traced back to the '70s

Reference:

Amir Pnueli (1977). "The temporal logic of programs". In: *18th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1977)*. IEEE, pp. 46–57.
DOI: 10.1109/SFCS.1977.32



In *artificial intelligence*, when do we need to use *logic* to talk about *time*?

- automated planning
 - temporally extended goals (Bacchus and Kabanza 1998)
 - temporal planning (Fox and Long 2003)
 - timeline-based planning (Della Monica et al. 2017)
- automated synthesis (Jacobs et al. 2017)
- autonomy under uncertainty (Brafman and De Giacomo 2019)
 - specification of goals for planning over MDPs and POMDPs
- reinforcement learning (De Giacomo et al. 2020; Hammond et al. 2021)
 - specification of reward functions and safety conditions
- knowledge representation
 - temporal description logics (Artale et al. 2014)
- multi-agent systems
 - temporal epistemic logics (van Benthem et al. 2009)




There are many choices to be made for the representation of *time*.

Linear



Branching





There are many choices to be made for the representation of *time*.

Infinite



Finite






There are many choices to be made for the representation of *time*.

Qualitative



Real-time





There are many choices to be made for the representation of *time*.

Discrete



Dense





There are many choices to be made for the representation of *time*.

We focus here on:

- *linear-time*
- *discrete-time*
- *qualitative-time*
- *infinite-time*
 - sometimes also *finite-time*



Linear Temporal Logic with Past (**LTL+P**, for short) is a *modal* logic.

- introduced by Pnueli in the '70s
- interpreted over discrete, infinite *state sequences* (infinite words)
- it extends classical *propositional* logic
- temporal *operators* are used to talk about how propositions change over time



Let $\mathcal{AP} := \{p, q, r, \dots\}$ be a set of *atomic propositions*. The syntax of **LTL+P** is defined as follows:

$$\phi := p \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \vee \phi$$

Boolean Modalities

$$\mid X\phi \mid \phi U \phi$$

Future Temporal Modalities

$$\mid Y\phi \mid \phi S \phi$$

Past Temporal Modalities


where $p \in \mathcal{AP}$.

- X is called *tomorrow* (or *next*)
- U is called *until*
- Y is called *yesterday* (or *previous*)
- S is called *since*



- We focus on the *infinite-time* interpretation of LTL+P.
- Given a set of atomic propositions \mathcal{AP} , any LTL+P formula defined over \mathcal{AP} is interpreted over *infinite words* $\sigma \in (2^{\mathcal{AP}})^\omega$.
- In this context, sequences in $(2^{\mathcal{AP}})^\omega$ are also called **state sequences** or **traces**.


$\mathcal{AP} := \{r, g\}$





We say that σ satisfies at position i the LTL+P formula ϕ , written $\sigma, i \models \phi$, iff:

- $\sigma, i \models p$ iff $p \in \sigma_i$



p holds at position i



We say that σ satisfies at position i the LTL+P formula ϕ , written $\sigma, i \models \phi$, iff:

- $\sigma, i \models \neg\phi$ iff $\sigma, i \not\models \phi$




ϕ does not hold at position i



We say that σ satisfies at position i the LTL+P formula ϕ , written $\sigma, i \models \phi$, iff:

- $\sigma, i \models \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2$ iff $\sigma, i \models \phi_1$ and $\sigma, i \models \phi_2$




ϕ_1 and ϕ_2 hold at position i



We say that σ satisfies at position i the LTL+P formula ϕ , written $\sigma, i \models \phi$, iff:

- $\sigma, i \models X\phi$ iff $\sigma, i + 1 \models \phi$




ϕ holds at the *next* position of i



We say that σ satisfies at position i the LTL+P formula ϕ , written $\sigma, i \models \phi$, iff:

- $\sigma, i \models \phi_1 \text{ U } \phi_2$ iff $\exists j \geq i . \sigma, j \models \phi_2$ and $\forall i \leq k < j . \sigma, k \models \phi_1$




ϕ_1 holds *until* ϕ_2 holds



We say that σ satisfies at position i the LTL+P formula ϕ , written $\sigma, i \models \phi$, iff:

- $\sigma, i \models Y\phi$ iff $i > 0$ and $\sigma, i - 1 \models \phi$




position i has a predecessor and ϕ holds at the *previous* position of i

Note: $\sigma, 0 \models Y\phi$ is always false.



We say that σ satisfies at position i the LTL+P formula ϕ , written $\sigma, i \models \phi$, iff:

- $\sigma, i \models \phi_1 \text{ S } \phi_2$ iff $\exists j \leq i . \sigma, j \models \phi_2$ and $\forall j < k \leq i . \sigma, k \models \phi_1$




ϕ_1 holds *since* ϕ_2 held



Shortcuts:

- (eventually) $F\phi \equiv \top U \phi$




ϕ will eventually hold



Shortcuts:

- (globally) $G\phi \equiv \neg F\neg\phi$




ϕ holds *always*



Shortcuts:


- (once) $O\phi \equiv \top S \phi$





Shortcuts:

- (historically) $H\phi \equiv \neg O\neg\phi$




ϕ holds *always in the past*



Shortcuts:

- (*weak yesterday*) $\tilde{Y}\phi \equiv \neg Y\neg\phi$



ϕ holds at the *previous* position of i , if any

Note: $\sigma, i \models \tilde{Y}\perp$ is true iff $i = 0$.



Definition (Negation Normal Form)

We define the $\text{nnf}(\cdot) : \text{LTL} \rightarrow \text{LTL}$ (*Negation Normal Form*) function as follows:

- $\text{nnf}(p) = p$
- $\text{nnf}(\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2) = \text{nnf}(\phi_1) \wedge \text{nnf}(\phi_2)$
- $\text{nnf}(\phi_1 \vee \phi_2) = \text{nnf}(\phi_1) \vee \text{nnf}(\phi_2)$
- $\text{nnf}(X\phi) = X(\text{nnf}(\phi))$
- $\text{nnf}(\phi_1 U \phi_2) = (\text{nnf}(\phi_1)) U (\text{nnf}(\phi_2))$
- $\text{nnf}(\phi_1 R \phi_2) = (\text{nnf}(\phi_1)) R (\text{nnf}(\phi_2))$

The release (R) operator is defined as the negation of the until (U):

$$\phi_1 R \phi_2 \equiv \neg((\neg\phi_1) U (\neg\phi_2)).$$

For any $\phi \in \text{LTL}$, the formula $\text{nnf}(\phi)$ has *negation only applied to atomic propositions*.



Definition (Negation Normal Form)

We define the $\text{nnf}(\cdot) : \text{LTL} \rightarrow \text{LTL}$ (*Negation Normal Form*) function as follows:

- $\text{nnf}(\neg p) = \neg p$
- $\text{nnf}(\neg\neg\phi) = \text{nnf}(\phi)$
- $\text{nnf}(\neg(\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2)) = \text{nnf}(\neg\phi_1) \vee \text{nnf}(\neg\phi_2)$
- $\text{nnf}(\neg(\phi_1 \vee \phi_2)) = \text{nnf}(\neg\phi_1) \wedge \text{nnf}(\neg\phi_2)$
- $\text{nnf}(\neg X\phi) = X(\text{nnf}(\neg\phi))$
- $\text{nnf}(\neg(\phi_1 U \phi_2)) = (\text{nnf}(\neg\phi_1)) R (\text{nnf}(\neg\phi_2))$
- $\text{nnf}(\neg(\phi_1 R \phi_2)) = (\text{nnf}(\neg\phi_1)) U (\text{nnf}(\neg\phi_2))$

For any $\phi \in \text{LTL}$, the formula $\text{nnf}(\phi)$ has *negation only applied to atomic propositions*.



- We say that σ *satisfies* ϕ (written $\sigma \models \phi$) iff $\sigma, 0 \models \phi$.
- For any LTL+P formula ϕ , we define *the language of ϕ over infinite words* as:

$$\mathcal{L}(\phi) = \{\sigma \in (2^{\mathcal{AP}})^\omega \mid \sigma \models \phi\}$$

- We say that ϕ is *satisfiable* iff $\mathcal{L}(\phi) \neq \emptyset$.
- We say that ϕ is *valid* iff $\mathcal{L}(\phi) = (2^{\mathcal{AP}})^\omega$.



Example:

Each request (r) is eventually followed by a grant (g).

$$G(r \rightarrow F(g))$$

Example:

Each grant (g) is preceded by a request (r).

$$G(g \rightarrow O(r))$$

REFERENCES



- Alessandro Artale et al. (2014).** “A Cookbook for Temporal Conceptual Data Modelling with Description Logics”. In: *ACM Trans. Comput. Log.* 15.3, 25:1–25:50. DOI: 10.1145/2629565.
- Fahiem Bacchus and Froduald Kabanza (1998).** “Planning for Temporally Extended Goals”. In: *Annals of Mathematics in Artificial Intelligence* 22.1-2, pp. 5–27.
- Ronen I. Brafman and Giuseppe De Giacomo (2019).** “Planning for LTLf /LDLf Goals in Non-Markovian Fully Observable Nondeterministic Domains”. In: *Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*. Ed. by Sarit Kraus. ijcai.org, pp. 1602–1608. DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2019/222.
- Giuseppe De Giacomo et al. (2020).** “Imitation Learning over Heterogeneous Agents with Restraining Bolts”. In: *Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Automated Planning and Scheduling*. AAAI Press, pp. 517–521.



- D. Della Monica et al. (2017).** “Bounded Timed Propositional Temporal Logic with Past Captures Timeline-based Planning with Bounded Constraints”. In: *Proc. of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pp. 1008–1014. DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2017/140.
- Maria Fox and Derek Long (2003).** “PDDL2.1: An Extension to PDDL for Expressing Temporal Planning Domains”. In: *J. Artif. Intell. Res.* 20, pp. 61–124. DOI: 10.1613/jair.1129.
- Lewis Hammond et al. (2021).** “Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning with Temporal Logic Specifications”. In: *Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems*. ACM, pp. 583–592. DOI: 10.5555/3463952.3464024.
- Swen Jacobs et al. (2017).** “The first reactive synthesis competition (SYNTCOMP 2014)”. In: *Int. J. Softw. Tools Technol. Transf.* 19.3, pp. 367–390. DOI: 10.1007/s10009-016-0416-3.



Robert McNaughton and Seymour A Papert (1971). *Counter-Free Automata* (MIT research monograph no. 65). The MIT Press.

Amir Pnueli (1977). “The temporal logic of programs”. In: *18th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1977)*. IEEE, pp. 46–57. DOI: 10.1109/SFCS.1977.32.

Arthur N Prior (2003). *Time and modality*. John Locke Lecture.

Ina Schiering and Wolfgang Thomas (1996). “Counter-free automata, first-order logic, and star-free expressions extended by prefix oracles”. In: *Developments in Language Theory, II (Magdeburg, 1995)*, World Sci. Publishing, River Edge, NJ, pp. 166–175.

Wolfgang Thomas (1979). “Star-free regular sets of ω -sequences”. In: *Information and Control* 42.2, pp. 148–156. DOI: 10.1016/S0019-9958(79)90629-6.



Johan van Benthem et al. (2009). “Merging Frameworks for Interaction”. In: *J. Philos. Log.* 38.5, pp. 491–526. DOI: 10.1007/s10992-008-9099-x.