



University of Udine

---

# Learning from Failures

*Machine Learning-based Monitoring  
for Runtime System Verification*

Andrea Brunello - [andrea.brunello@uniud.it](mailto:andrea.brunello@uniud.it)  
Andrea Urgolo - [urgolo.andrea@spes.uniud.it](mailto:urgolo.andrea@spes.uniud.it)

In several domains, systems generate continuous streams of data which may contain useful telemetry information

They can be used for tasks such as predictive maintenance and preemptive failure detection

System behaviours can be convoluted, being the result of the interaction among several components and the environment (Industry 4.0)


Given the complexity of this setting, deep learning approaches have also been considered. Problems:

- resulting models are hardly interpretable
- difficulty in providing guarantees on the obtained results

In critical contexts, formal methods have been recognized as an effective approach to ensure the correct behaviour of a system.

However, classical techniques, such as model checking, require a complete specification of the system and of the properties to be checked against it, in an offline fashion.

-> In some cases this may be very difficult!



Framework that combines machine learning and monitoring to detect critical system behaviours in an on-line setting:

- system behaviour's complexity is dealt with by means of machine learning


- extracted formal properties are interpretable, so a domain expert can easily read and validate the generated model

Monitoring is a run-time verification technique:

establishes satisfaction/violation of a property analyzing a finite prefix of a single behaviour (run) of the system

lightweight technique compared to model checking

naturally applicable to data streaming contexts



# Monitoring: Monitorable Properties

When the monitor reaches a verdict, the latter is definitive.

Positively monitorable properties:

every system satisfying it features a finite trace witnessing the satisfaction

*it is possible to reach a success state*

Negatively monitorable properties:

every system violating it features a finite trace witnessing the violation

*it is not possible to reach a success state in less than 2 steps*

Not all properties are monitorable:

*it is possible to reach a success state, but it is not possible to reach it in less than 2 steps*

# Linear Temporal Logic [Pnueli 1977]

Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is an extension of propositional Boolean logic with modalities that allow one to express temporal properties over linear structures (e.g., individual computation paths).

$$\varphi := \top \mid p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2 \mid \varphi_1 U \varphi_2 \mid X\varphi$$

$$\pi, s_i \models p \in P \Leftrightarrow V(p, s_i) = \text{true}$$

$$\pi, s_i \models \neg\alpha \Leftrightarrow \pi, s_i \not\models \alpha$$

$$\pi, s_i \models \alpha \wedge \beta \Leftrightarrow \pi, s_i \models \alpha \wedge \pi, s_i \models \beta$$

$$\pi, s_i \models X\alpha \Leftrightarrow \pi, s_{i+1} \models \alpha$$

$$\pi, s_i \models F\alpha \Leftrightarrow \exists j \geq i : \pi, s_j \models \alpha$$

$$\pi, s_i \models G\alpha \Leftrightarrow \forall j \geq i : \pi, s_j \models \alpha$$

$$\pi, s_i \models \alpha U \beta \Leftrightarrow \exists j \geq i : \pi, s_j \models \beta \text{ e } \forall k \text{ s.t. } i \leq k < j : \pi, s_k \models \alpha$$

Positively monitorable properties:

every system satisfying it features a finite trace witnessing the satisfaction

*it is possible to reach a success state:  $F \text{ success}$*

Negatively monitorable properties:

every system violating it features a finite trace witnessing the violation

*it is not possible to reach a success state:  $G : \text{success}$*

Not all properties are monitorable:

*it is possible to reach a success state and there is also a step from which is not possible to reach a success state anymore:*

$F \text{ success} \wedge F(G : \text{success})$



Signal Temporal Logic (STL) is an extension of LTL with *real-time* and *real-valued* constraints

$$\varphi := \text{true} \mid f(\mathbf{x}) \sim c \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2 \mid \varphi_1 \mathbf{U}_I \varphi_2$$

$$(\mathbf{x}, t) \models f(\mathbf{x}) \sim c \iff f(\mathbf{x}(t)) \sim c \text{ is true}$$

$$(\mathbf{x}, t) \models \neg\varphi \iff (\mathbf{x}, t) \not\models \varphi$$

$$(\mathbf{x}, t) \models \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2 \iff (\mathbf{x}, t) \models \varphi_1 \wedge (\mathbf{x}, t) \models \varphi_2$$

$$(\mathbf{x}, t) \models \varphi_1 \mathbf{U}_I \varphi_2 \iff \exists t_1 \in t \oplus I : (\mathbf{x}, t_1) \models \varphi_2 \wedge \forall t_2 \in [t, t_1) : (\mathbf{x}, t_2) \models \varphi_1$$

where  $f \in \{>, <, \geq, \leq, =\}$  and  $I := (a;b) \mid [a;b) \mid (a;b] \mid [a;b]$  with  $a, b \in \mathbb{R}^{\geq 0}$  and  $a \leq b$

In addition to the Boolean semantics, quantitative semantics of STL quantifies the *robustness degree* of satisfaction by a particular trace

$$\rho(\top, x, t) = +\infty$$

$$\rho(x_i \geq c, x, t) = x_i(t) - c$$


$$\rho(\neg\phi, x, t) = -\rho(\phi, x, t)$$

$$\rho(\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2, x, t) = \min\{\rho(\phi_1, x, t), \rho(\phi_2, x, t)\}$$

$$\rho(\phi_1 U_I \phi_2, x, t) = \sup_{t_1 \in t+I} \min\{\rho(\phi_2, x, t_1), \inf_{t_2 \in [t, t_1]} \rho(\phi_1, x, t_2)\}$$


# STL: Example 1

In addition to the Boolean semantics, quantitative semantics of STL quantify the *robustness degree* of satisfaction by a particular trace



## STL: Example 2

In addition to the Boolean semantics, quantitative semantics of STL quantify the *robustness degree* of satisfaction by a particular trace



For our purposes, we are interested in extracting constrasting STL specifications


- Framework for inference of timed temporal logic properties from data

- Produces a binary decision tree which can be translated in a STL formula and used for classification

- Each node of the tree is associated with a simple formula chosen from a set of *primitives*

- Optimality is assessed using *impurity* measures leveraging the *robustness degree* which capture how well a primitive splits the signals in the training data

# DTL4STL - Decision Tree Classifier



For each node a formula that minimize the *impurity* measure is chosen from a set of *primitives*.

The optimization of the parameters in order to minimize the impurity measure is carried out through the Simulated Annealing algorithm. The overall complexity is  $O(N(\log N))$ .





## Execution Modes:

warmup: mimic the continual arrival of the available traces from data pertaining to past system failures or generated by means of simulations

online: incoming traces of the currently monitored system are considered

## Execution Strategies:

semi-supervised domain experts specify an initial set of properties to be monitored against the execution of the system

unsupervised monitor initialized with just a single “the machinery is in operation” property

Information regarding the health status of ST4000DM000 hard drive model in the Backblaze data center

Data recorded daily from 2015 to 2017

21 SMART parameters including both discrete and real values

Label which indicates a drive failure

Initial phase in unsupervised learning warmup mode on a sample of training set execution traces which exhibited a failure

Two evaluation modes:

- online, in which the framework continues to learn properties from the execution traces of the test set of ine, for SOTA comparison purposes

Counter-over tting measures (trees):

- maximum height of 3
- minimum cross-validation accuracy score of 0.9
- maximum false alarm rate of 0.1 wrt pool of good training traces

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{TP}{TP + FP}; \quad \text{Recall} = \frac{TP}{TP + FN};$$

$$\text{FAR} = \frac{FP}{FP + TN}; \quad \text{F1} = \frac{2 \text{ Precision Recall}}{\text{Precision} + \text{Recall}} :$$

# Application: RUL and Online Results

Failure in which the hardware read error rate stays below  $1:6 \cdot 10^8$  for a certain amount of time, and then, at a later time, it exceeds  $229 \cdot 10^8$ )

The pattern represents a situation in which the errors encountered in reading data grow over time, till they exceed a warning threshold

Pattern witnessed during the warmupphase:

- 1 formula  $f_1 = F_{[25;45]} \text{SMART}_{198} > 2:59$  is extracted  
critical sensor regarding sector read/write errors
- 2 formula  $f_1$  triggers a failure prediction
- 3 as a consequence  $f_2 = F_{[11;36]} \text{SMART}_{189} > 8:28$  is extracted  
non-critical sensor regarding unsafe y height conditions

The disk head is operating at an unsafe height, ultimately damaging a disk sector and consequently causing read and write errors (link between a non-critical and a critical sensor).

Monotonicity of the monitoring pool      property score?

Warmup learning on good traces

Redundancy in the monitoring pool

RUL estimation



- Giuseppe Bombara et al. (2016). “A decision tree approach to data classification using signal temporal logic”. In: Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control, pp. 1–10.
- Andrea Brunello, Dario Della Monica, and Angelo Montanari (2019). “Pairing Monitoring with Machine Learning for Smart System Verification and Predictive Maintenance”. In: Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Formal Verification, Logic, Automata, and Synthesis, Vol. 2509. CEUR Workshop Proceedings, pp. 71–76.
- Andrea Brunello, Dario Della Monica, et al. (2020). “Learning How to Monitor: Pairing Monitoring and Learning for Online System Verification”. In:

- Ian Cassar et al. (2017). “A Survey of Runtime Monitoring Instrumentation Techniques”. In: Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Pre- Post-Deployment Verification Techniques, pp. 15–28.
- Alexandre Donzé (2013). “On signal temporal logic”. In: International Conference on Runtime Verification, Springer, pp. 382–383.
- Marcus Gerhold, Arnd Hartmanns, and Mariëlle Stoelinga (2019). “Model-Based Testing of Stochastically Timed Systems”. In: Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering 15.3-4, pp. 207–233. DOI: 10.1007/s11334-019-00349-z URL: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11334-019-00349-z>
- N. Jansen et al. (2018). “Machine Learning and Model Checking Join Forces”. In: Dagstuhl Report 3, pp. 74–93.

- Martin Leucker and Christian Schallhart (2009). “A brief account of Runtime Verification”. In: *Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming* 78.5, pp. 293–303. ISSN: 1567-8326. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlap.2008.08.004>. URL: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1567832608000775>.
- Oded Maler and Dejan Nickovic (2004). “Monitoring temporal properties of continuous signals”. In: *Formal Techniques, Modelling and Analysis of Timed and Fault-Tolerant Systems*. Springer, pp. 152–166.
- Amir Pnueli (1977). “The temporal logic of programs”. In: *Proceedings of the 18th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science*. IEEE, pp. 46–57.

*Property Pattern Mappings for LTL* (n.d.).

<https://matthewbdwyer.github.io/psp/>. Kansas State University CIS Department, Laboratory for Specification, Analysis, and Transformation of Software (SAnToS Laboratory) – accessed online on 17 July 2020.